Sunday, March 31, 2013

Dinosaur Prints on the Plum Run Bridge at Gettysburg

If you follow South Confederate Avenue until it wraps around to the base of Bushman's Hill, before long you will be crossing Plum Run on a beautiful bridge that leads to the Round Tops beyond.  That bridge is quite special.  On its stone walls are proof of the dinosaurs that once walked the planet in our very region!  On the south side of the bridge there is one noticeable print that overhangs the rest of the wall on the fifth panel from the side towards Bushman Hill (away from Big Round Top).  On the north side of the bridge are two more prints from a dinosaur that was about the size of a medium domesticated dog.  

South Wall of the bridge...

North Wall of the bridge...

Sunday, March 24, 2013

Pennsylvania at Antietam Part 1 - 50th Pennsylvania

The Maryland Campaign Begins

50th PA on parade in Beaufort, SC early in the war
          After suffering demoralizing defeats on the Peninsula and at Manassas for the second time, Lincoln knew that General George B. McClellan (“Little Mac”) was the only officer at his disposal who could boost morale and reorganize the Federal Army in time for Lee's next move.  McClellan took over command of the Army of the Potomac on September 2nd, 1862 and as Lee moved north into Maryland on the 4th, he was forced to pursue.  The 50th PA marched north from their safety in the Washington defenses along with the rest of the Army of the Potomac carrying a renewed fighting spirit to meet Lee's Army and destroy it.  The 50th was attached to Reno's IX Corps as a part of Willcox's 1st Division, Christ's 1st Brigade.  The command of the regiment fell to Major Edward Overton Jr. since Colonel Christ was promoted to brigade command and Lieutenant Colonel Brenholtz was still recovering from the wound he received at Second Manassas.
          On September 13th, while camping near Frederick, MD, members of 27th Indiana found a piece of paper wrapped around three cigars that would completely turn the tide of the campaign in favor of the Army of the Potomac.  This piece of paper was "Special Order 191" which was supposed to be delivered to Confederate General Daniel H. Hill from Robert E. Lee on September 9th.  The soldiers who discovered the orders quickly passed the document up the chain of command until it reached General McClellan's headquarters.  Once McClellan realized what the document contained, he was sure he could whip 'Bobby Lee' at his own game.  The orders contained Lee's entire plan to dispatch Jackson, McLaws and Walker to capture the garrison at Harper's Ferry while the rest of his command and Longstreet concentrated around Hagerstown, Maryland.
          Along with his forces at Harper's Ferry, Lee dispatched General Daniel H. Hill's Division to protect the passes over South Mountain until his scattered army could reunite near Sharpsburg.  With all this knowledge at hand thanks to the 'lost order', and after more delay, McClellan finally made his move on the morning of September 14th, sending his army towards the gaps on South Mountain.  Three major fights would ensue at Turner's, Fox's, and Crampton's Gaps.
          The 50th PA participated in the battle at Fox's Gap.  They were ordered to protect the left flank and held firm during a counter-charge with a portion of Cox's Kanawha Division, suffering only two casualties during the engagement.  Their actions in the gap were by all accounts trying and steadfast as they endured Rebel artillery for a substantial period of time, all the while standing firm.  The 17th Michigan of their own brigade suffered a great deal more in casualties as they led an assault along the Old Sharpsburg Road, their very first taste of combat during the war. They drove the Rebels down the mountainside, but at a great cost.  Of their nearly 500 men that entered the fight that day, they lost 27 killed and 114 wounded.
Reno Monument at South Mountain Battlefield
          Also during the battle at Fox's Gap, the IX Corps' commander, General Jessie Reno, was mortally wounded.  As he was taken to the rear a famous encounter took place between General Reno and one of his division commander's General Samuel Sturgis, who was a good friend from before the war.  He remarked,"Hallo Sam, I'm dead!  Yes, yes, I'm dead!  Good bye!"  Shortly there after he passed away.  He would later be replaced by Brigadier General Jacob Cox and thus ended the first vicious fight of the Maryland Campaign at Fox's Gap as a Federal victory.
          On the 15th of September the Confederates gave up their remaining positions on South Mountain at Turner's Gap to concentrate in a defensive position around Sharpsburg and await the hopefully timely arrival of General Jackson from Harper's Ferry.  After more unduly delay, McClellan would finally move his men towards Sharpsburg as well, ever apprehensive from exaggerations of being outnumbered and overpowered.  The Army of the Potomac would camp within spitting distance of the Army of Northern Virginia on the night of September 16th after some afternoon skirmishing west of the Antietam Creek that faded with the sun. 
          General Jackson, after capturing the garrison, had indeed arrived from Harper's Ferry and reinforced the Confederate left flank.  Jackson left one division under General A.P. Hill at Harper's Ferry to finish the job of processing prisoners and supplies, with orders to make haste to Sharpsburg as soon as practicable.  That evening a steady rain began to fall and the men of both sides passed a restless night filled with premonitions about what the morrow held in store for them.  Many of the veterans surely held much anticipation for battle, as if a great storm were brewing.

The Bloodiest Day in American History

          For the 50th PA, September 17th, 1862 began wearily, with the regiment having been assigned guard duty the previous evening.  Very early that morning after a soggy venture on the picket line, the men of the 50th PA and the rest of the IX Corps awoke to the sounds of heavy musketry and artillery to the northwest.  Encamped east of the Antietam Creek on the Rohrbach Farm, action would be slow to reach these men. Burnside's troops, if in fact you can call them Burnside's, had a grand view of the morning's battlefield.

“From our position we looked, as it were, down between the opposing lines as if they had been the sides of a street, and as the fire opened we saw wounded men carried to the rear and stragglers making off.  Our lines halted, and we were tortured with anxiety as we speculated whether our men would charge or retreat.”
- Major General Ambrose Burnside

          With the restructuring of the Army of the Potomac, McClellan made Burnside a Wing Commander and he acted as such at the Battle of South Mountain, just three days prior.  With the impending battle and the death of General Jessie Reno, Brigadier General Jacob Cox of the Kanawha Division became commander of the IX Corps.  This left Burnside, to some degree, jobless because McClellan had abandoned his previous notions of having wing commanders and never really established what command Burnside was to possess.  This created a very awkward kink in the hierarchy of the IX Corps. Many historians have argued that this might have been the reason for their problems on the battlefield that day.  Burnside's respite towards McClellan would rear its ugly head many times in the battle to come.  Throughout the morning hours, the men of the IX Corps kept their eyes on the devastation to the north as it slowly progressed towards their positions, from The Cornfield, to Dunker Church, to the Sunken Road.
          When orders did finally successfully arrive to Burnside from McClellan, the progress was slower still.  The first orders were received around 7AM with McClellan ordering the IX Corps to “stand bye.”  Finally at 10AM, Burnside was ordered to push across the Lower Rohrbach Bridge and coordinate his attack in the general direction of the Bridge Road that meandered its way into Sharpsburg, about a mile to the northwest.  It was also made very clear to him that he was to carry the bridge at all costs.  After some delay, Burnside and Cox finally had a plan they thought worthy of taking the bridge.  They would deploy General Isaac Rodman's 3rd Division to the south, by which they would ford the Antietam at a location previously selected by McClellan's engineers and then swing north.  Meanwhile, the rest of the IX Corps would push across the bridge in force, hoping to reunite with Rodman's Division on the west bank of the creek and advance towards the town from there.  Little did the commanders of the IX Corps truly understand the difficulties to come in this endeavor.
          General Sturgis' Division was chosen to lead the assault across the bridge and the geography around it proved to be a difficult obstacle to overcome.  The eastern bank of the Antietam has a wide flood plain that created a very large and open field of fire for anyone defending an attempted crossing from the opposite bank.  The western bank slopes steeply down into the creek for nearly one hundred feet and was entirely wooded at the time of the battle.  For the Rebel defenders, this  steep and very defensible bluff would prove to be an impregnable fortress.  Sturgis really had no idea how many Rebels held the opposite bank and poor reconnaissance made Federal officers believe that they would receive little resistance.  In fact, with just two Confederate regiments defending the bridge, a coordinated assault from an entire division looks favorable numerically.  But there in lies the problem.  
          General Robert E. Lee's right flank was the weakest part of his battle line being forced to pull troops to aid his actions to the north.  By the time the IX Corps assault began, Lee had one division remaining there under General D.R. Jones from Longstreet's Corps.  The terrain on the west side of the Antietam was Jones' only ally for the fight that was to come.  Although greatly outnumbered, the mile or so between the Antietam Creek and Sharpsburg was probably the best defensive ground on the entire battlefield.  That being said, Jones had to place his brigades carefully.  He placed Toombs' Georgia Brigade along the west bank of the creek to thwart any attempted thrusts across the bridge.  His orders clear, Toombs had the 2nd and 20th GA regiments posted directly above the bridge and their combined 500 men were to make life miserable for the Federals attempting to cross.  The rest of Jones' Division was positioned on the heights just outside of town with plenty of artillery support from the vicinity of Cemetery Hill. 
Burnside's (Lower Rohrbach) Bridge
          The first attempt on the bridge was made by the 11th CT with promised support from Crook's Kanawha Brigade that never came.  Rebel artillery had the bridge area in the cross-hairs and a few batteries on the heights west of the Bridge Road wreaked havoc on the Federal positions, all the while receiving counter battery fire from heavy Federal batteries to the east.  The 11th charged up the Bridge Road subjecting themselves to a deadly fire of shell and musketry that sliced through their ranks and left their Colonel Henry Kingsbury, the brother-in-law of Confederate General D.R. Jones, mortally wounded.  The regiment sacrificed 138 men in their attempt on the bridge. 
          Division commander, General Sam Sturgis, then ordered Brigadier General James Nagle to advance his brigade in an effort to take the bridge.  Nagle ordered the 48th PA and a few batteries on the crest to provided covering fire for the rest of the brigade, as it would then head north up the Lower Bridge Road in a very similar manner as the previous attack.  The rebels on the hill held their fire until the boys from the 9th New Hampshire and 2nd Maryland came into what must have seemed like a 'Valley of Death.'   Casualties during the advance were staggering and the attack stalled about seventy five yards from the bridge.  The two regiments lost a combined 137 men in another failed assault.
          Finally it was the turn of Brigadier General Edward Ferrero's Brigade to make an attempt on the bridge.  He decided he would use both the 51st NY and 51st PA to spearhead his assault, using the remaining regiments for covering fire.  This time though, Ferrero would make his assault from the hill directly east of the bridge, shortening the distance to the bridge and minimizing enfilading fire.  As he called his men into line of battle, one of the men from the 51st PA cried, "Will you give us our whiskey back?", referring to a previous embargo placed on the regiment for bad behavior.  Ferrero replied, "If you take that bridge you can have all the whiskey you want!"  With that the 51st PA, 51st NY, and 35th MA headed directly toward the bridge, down the slope and across the shortened field of fire.   Although the flanking fire of the Georgians on the opposite hillside was narrowed, the brigade sustained heavy casualties.  This time though, the attack slowly started to make its way across the bridge, inch by inch.  The Rebels on the hillside realized that the shear numbers in front of them would spell their demise and wisely began to pull back.  At this point, Ferrero's Brigade began to pour over the span and Burnside finally had his bridge. The 51st PA also got its' whiskey back.
          Meanwhile, farther to the south, Isaac Rodman's division was having all kinds of trouble finding the ford because of poor reconnaissance and faulty maps.  When they did finally find the ford selected by McClellan's engineers, it proved to be unsuitable for crossing since the banks on both sides were simply too steep to quickly and efficiently cross the creek with a whole division.  This was just one more blunder on a slate of blunders that would plague the IX Corps assault on Lee's right, providing him more time to bring up reinforcements that would change the course of the battle. 
          On top of the delay, much of the fighting at the northern end of the battlefield had died down by this time, allowing Lee to focus his attention to the south.  This does not necessarily reflect a positive circumstance though because he still had to keep his defensive lines intact to the north in case of a renewed attack by McClellan.  The problems for the Army of Northern Virginia on September 17th had more to do with simply being outnumbered.  McClellan played his cards to Lee's favor though, by buying him time to mass his troops and by simply attacking without any coordination. 
          After some more difficulty, Rodman's staff was finally able to locate a suitable crossing point a half mile farther downstream.  This location is known as Snavely's Ford and although it is only a mile as the crow flies from the Lower Rohrbach Bridge, Rodman had to march his men almost two miles to get to the crossing.  Both Harland and Fairchild's Brigades made their way across the ford with little harassment, all the while being watched by men of the 50th GA, who slowly retired to the west.  For Rodman's Division, their long day was just beginning as the attack that awaited them would prove equally as trying.

The Grand Attack

          Finally across the Antietam Creek and after nearly three hours of lost time, Burnside and Cox were ready to form their IX Corps for a push against the one Confederate division defending the heights outside of Sharpsburg.  Since Sturgis' Division was used in assaulting the bridge, his men would act as a reserve for the general advance.  On the right of the attacking line would be the division of Orlando B. Willcox with his brigades of Benjamin Christ on the right and Thomas Welsh on the left.  Rodman's Division would make up the left flank of the advance with Fairchild's Brigade on the right and Harland's on the left.  Scammon's Kanawha Division would act as a support for both Rodman and Willcox as they advanced.  All said, the advancing Federal line would be nearly a mile wide.

          As the Federals formed up in the low area adjacent to the Bridge Road, the Confederates poured a galling fire into their ranks from the batteries posted on the heights around town.  Known to many who fought there as “Artillery Hell,” this part of the Antietam Battlefield provided plenty of fireworks from both sides in regards to artillery.   As more men fell victim to the rain of iron, the men of the IX Corps continued to form their battle line and after a half hour, they were ready for the advance.

“Now a large force made its appearance, marching to the front, having debouched from the woods on the banks of the Antietam, which had partially concealed them. At the same time heavy bodies were observed moving to attack our troops on the right, composed of Drayton's and a portion of Kemper's brigades. I moved my command some distance to the front in the standing corn (as many of my guns were short range), in order that they could produce more effect, and opened fire.”
- Brigadier General R.B. Garnett

          The terrain that proved such an ally to D.R. Jones' Division was equally detrimental to the Federal advance.  A series of steeply rolling hills, bisected by the Bridge Road caused serious delays in portions of the advancing Federal line.  It might be likened to a wave, pushing and stalling in different locations along its length as it progressed.  The Confederates were also thwarting Federal efforts by posting skirmishers well in advance of their own line to snipe away at every step of the attack, using terrain features to their advantage.  One regiment, the 15th SC, greatly bolstered its reputation on this day by putting up a deadly and defiant stand along the center of the Federal line, harassing every movement. 
          Colonel Benjamin Christ's Brigade, on the extreme right of the line, advanced under a severe hail of artillery to the crest of the ridge above the Sherrick Farm, all the while meeting resistance from the 56th VA of Garnett's Brigade.  The 'Highlanders' of the 79th NY were out front skirmishing followed by the main battle line comprised of the 28th MA, 50th PA and 17th MI.
Monument to the 50th PA at the crest of the hill north of the Sherrick Farm
“Prostrated upon the ground at the crest of the hill, we endured a severe fire from the enemy's artillery.” - Adj. Lewis Crater 50th PA

After reaching the crest, Christ realized that Welsh's Brigade to the left was lagging behind, so he ordered a halt to the advance until they could catch up.  Welsh's men were receiving the brunt of the 15th SC's stand and also faced obstacles around the Otto Farm slowing their forward progress.  After delivering a few well aimed volleys, they resumed their advance, the 45th and 100th  PA driving the Rebels before them.  Finally reunited, both Christ and Welsh were ready to continue their push towards Sharpsburg.
          The southern end of the line was having equal success, but at a great cost, losing men with every step across the fields of the Otto Farm.  Fairchild's Brigade pushed west towards the men of Kemper and Drayton's Brigades, hiding behind a stone wall on the distant hill.  As the men of the 9th, 89th and 103rd NY crossed the ravine in their front, they received a deadly potion of musketry and shell from the infantry and lone battery posted along the wall.  The 9th NY Zouaves suffered most as they were mowed down with canister from the battery in their front.
          Federal batteries also played their part in the attack rushing across the bridge and advancing as they were permitted by cover of the infantry assault.  Once the advancing line had passed the Otto Farm they unlimbered along the ridge that runs to the south of the farm house with three batteries totaling eighteen guns.  Cook's battery also had two guns in the Otto Orchard belching towards the Rebel positions.  
          Although the Confederate Brigades on the outskirts of Sharpsburg were putting up a stubborn resistance to the Federal onslaught, the tides were beginning to move against them.  Being outnumbered and in the face of a Federal attack that was full of alacrity and persistence,  some regiments began to falter.  On the Confederate left, Garnett's artillery support pulled out and his regiments began to fall back towards town.  Christ's Brigade provided a healthy dose of musketry and showed no signs of retiring.  Welsh's Brigade also continued along the Bridge Road towards town, driving Walker's South Carolinians in their front.  Willcox's two brigades continued their push nearly to the streets of Sharpsburg and it appeared that the 'final' victory was near. 

“While halting under cover from the enemy directly in front, he opened a battery on my left which commanded my whole line from left to right, and for thirty minutes we were under a most severe fire of round shot, shell, grape, and canister, and suffered severely. It was impossible to move forward for the reason before stated - no place in the neighborhood that afforded any cover - and the alternative presented itself either to retire from a good and only position from which to advance on the enemy in front, or to wait patiently until some demonstration on the left would compel him to change the direction of his fire. Again, I could not get under cover without retiring at least 250 yards, in full view of the enemy, and if there would have been the least confusion the men might have retreated in disorder, and exposed and largely increased the list of casualties. I chose the former, and was gratified by having my expectations realized.  A demonstration on the left compelled the enemy to change the direction of his fire, and my supports coming, we moved to the front, where we engaged the enemy on his left, and in about one hour succeeded in driving both his artillery and infantry from the position.” - Colonel Benjamin Christ (Commander 1st Brigade, 50th PA)

Looking towards Cemetery Hill from near the left
center of the IX Corps battle line.  The 50th PA
Monument is on the cleared hill in the left background.
Kemper and Drayton's Brigades were among the last to start moving backwards and in fact, at times it seemed as if Fairchild's assault was stalling because of the large holes being torn out of his lines, but they too continued moving towards town.
          Just when it seemed that all might be lost and Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was in danger of being totally and completely swept away, a dust cloud arose to the west.  That dust cloud brought with it, not only the salvation of Lee's army, but the continuation of a war that would cost many thousands more in lives and shattered homes.  After processing prisoners and finishing up the details of the successful Confederate capture of the Federal garrison at Harper's Ferry, General A.P. Hill had made good on his orders from Stonewall Jackson to make all haste to Sharpsburg with his light division.  He had force-marched his men seventeen miles in seven hours to reach the battlefield just in time. 
          Hill's two brigades under Branch and Gregg launched a counter-attack at the perfect place as well, right into the left flank of Rodman's Division.  Harland's Brigade received the brunt of the attack and total chaos ensued.  The 8th CT was to the front of the brigade, closing in on Fairchild's left flank, which left it floating alone until Harland realized what was happening.  Vicious hand-to-hand combat broke out as Branch's and Gregg's men sliced through the Federal ranks in a 40-acre cornfield that aided in masking their charge.  Harland attempted to reorganize to meet the new threat, but for his green men of the 16th CT and 4th RI, this was their first action and they simply could not change fronts in time. 

“Colonel Beach rallied them and returned to the attack, but they were again driven back, this time out of the corn-field, beyond the fence. Here they were again rallied, but as it was impossible to see the enemy; and the men were under fire for the first time, they could not be held.” - Colonel Harland

          Because of their inability to reform with some sort of organization, the men started to fall back in the direction from which they initially advanced.  During this sway from assault to retreat, Harland's Brigade was shattered, losing nearly half his men.  It was also around this time that General Rodman was mortally wounded while directing his men to face the new threat.  He was one more shining star lost to the Federal Army in another failed attack full of lost opportunities.
          Hill's Division began rolling up the Federal line like a carpet and the men of Willcox's Division could see what was coming.  They quickly started to withdrawal back across the Sherrick and Otto Farms towards the Antietam Creek.  In the fields along the entire route of their retreat lay the men that fell from their ranks during their trying and nearly successful attempt to turn Lee's right flank.
          As Branch's Brigade had Fairchild's men reeling back across the fields of the Otto Farm, General Hill was conferring with both Generals Branch and Gregg.  To these three great warriors the field must have looked something like a perfect storm.  Those waves of gray, led by their national standards, were the last thing Brigadier General Lawrence Branch would ever see.  He was hit in the head and instantly killed, the sixth and last general to fall on that bloody day.
          The Federal line fell back to the west bank of Antietam Creek and formed a kind of bridgehead around what would soon become known as Burnside's Bridge.  Indeed it warranted a renaming as the IX Corps lost nearly 3,000 men in their assault, while the Confederate forces lost somewhere around 1,200.  The men of the IX Corps prepared themselves for another assault that would never come, thanks to their always inching leader in General George McClellan.  The Confederates pursued only as far as the fields south of the Otto Farm before reforming their own line on the outskirts of town.  The implications of the repulse of the IX Corps on this part of the field were a sort of salvation for General Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia.  Indeed Lee must have had no qualms with McClellan biding his time.  They put out skirmishers, but were satisfied with keeping their distance until they could retire back across the Potomac.  Lee had been granted another grand opportunity to continue the hostilities of war and in some ways, the Maryland Campaign might be considered the rebirth of the Army of Northern Virginia.

The Aftermath

Antietam National Cemetery on the 150th Anniversary of the battle
          For both armies Antietam would represent a victory of some significance.  Whether it was a matter of justification for the vast amounts of human carnage, or simply military strategy, Antietam changed the face of the American Civil War. 
          Lee surely held concerns about McClellan's intentions on the days that followed September 17th, but he must have also been hopeful and maybe even confident that the Commander of the Army of the Potomac would not change his tactics based fully on his own prudence.  On the 18th, McClellan kept his army sitting and Lee quickly and efficiently ordered his Army of Northern Virginia back across the Potomac River at Boteler's Ford.  While the Federals were burying the dead, McClellan was letting Lee slip away once more to continue a war full of ghastly suffering for both sides.  Some might argue that the Maryland Campaign was the Union Army's greatest chance to end the war early.  In considering all the botched plans and execution by McClellan at Antietam, the outcome is surely tied to his apprehensions.  Even after making early mistakes, he was time and again presented with opportunities to be the “Great Napoleon” that he perceived himself to be, and he failed by a wide margin.  Having nearly double the strength of the Army of Northern Virginia, McClellan left a substantial reserve force sitting in the rear on September 17th that would have been the difference.  Most of the Federal V and VI Corps awaited an opportunity to get into the fight that day that would never come.
          The Army of Northern Virginia had certainly proved that it could hold its own in enemy territory.  Although the overall campaign may be painted as a failed invasion, Lee was able to split his army as he would do many times later in the war. He gave the perception of a larger force in such instances like the capture of Harper's Ferry, or the delaying action at South Mountain by General D.H. Hill.  The Gray Fox had totally outdone the Army of the Potomac.  With his military genius and an army full of spirit, he had tested the waters for what lay ahead.  Eight months later, Lee would again be heading north into the heart of 'Yankee Country' and end up fighting at Gettysburg.
          Of course McClellan proclaimed to Washington that a great victory was won at a great cost.  The folks in Washington, including Lincoln himself, would eventually catch up to the transparency of McClellan's arrogance and on November 5th, removed him from command.  Before this though, Lincoln went to the battlefield for a surprise visit on the first day of October, to see for himself the devastation of war.  He visited with McClellan, Burnside and others who could fill in the details, providing him a more vivid sense of the events that took place there.  Lincoln probably also intended to get his general moving again on Lee's army.  What was said between both he and McClellan will never be known since there are no recorded details or witnesses to the sessions, but “Little Mac” was definitely right about one thing, that being the great cost.
          Antietam, to this day and probably forever, will stand as the single bloodiest day in American history.  Over 22,000 men fell in the fields around Sharpsburg on September 17th, 1862.  Some regiments would never recover the fighting capabilities they lost that day.  The leadership lost in the ranks was also devastating and something that would haunt both armies in the battles to come.  Most of the men fighting that day would remember Antietam as the most horrific experience of their lives, but they were also thankful for the opportunity to carry on since many of their friends would remain in the fields around Sharpsburg forever. 
          The war would go on for another two and a half years and there was still much loss and devastation to come, but no battle on a single day would come close to the losses suffered at Antietam.  For its part in the IX Corps advance on Lee's right, the 50th PA suffered substantially.  Their casualties were 8 killed, 46 wounded and 3 missing, for a total of 57 men.  Colonel Christ and Major Overton both suffered wounds during the battle and Captain James Ingham of Company K was killed.  Their brigade  had lost a total of 406 men in the Maryland Campaign. 

"On the 17th Edward Harner get killed by a canon ball & a bullet went in my cap and cut the skin a little on my head & one ball hid my Rifel O god the dead and wounded lays by hunderds &1000s on the next day ...O that the almighty god in heaven would make a ant of this war...The line of battle was twist as broud that our valy at home ...You might think how I did feel when I saw so many boys fall out our Regt.  All I have to say take good care of our children. O my dear children what you do dont curse nor sware so if I cant see yous any more in this wourld so that we can meat in heaven were no war and no fighting can be no more." - Sgt. Samuel Schwalm Co. A  50th PA

Colonel Benjamin Christ forever stands atop the 50th PA Monument gazing towards Cemetery Hill

Friday, March 8, 2013

"To Do or Die:" Colonel Edward Bailey and the 2nd New Hampshire at the Peach Orchard

2nd NH Monument
Given less attention when it comes to the vast list of sources on the Gettysburg Campaign, the Peach Orchard at Gettysburg is in my opinion one of the most important acts of the drama that unfolded on July 2, 1863.  Despite many differing opinions on the legitimacy of Major General Daniel Sickles' decisions and his move out to Joseph Sherfy's little peach orchard, no one can deny the importance of this critical position on that fateful afternoon.  A few key decisions by one man made this place the eye of the storm on the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg.

Many regiments of the Third Army Corps fought doggedly in their resistance on that day.  One of those, the Second New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry under the command of Colonel Edward Bailey, played a critical role in the struggle around the orchard and suffered immense casualties.  Thanks to keen and intelligent leadership by their commander in reaction to the regiment's continually dire circumstances, they somehow managed to make good the escape of a great number of men defending the deadly salient.

Colonel Edward L. Bailey
Colonel Edward Lyon Bailey hailed from Manchester, New Hampshire.  He was elected Captain of Company I shortly after the regiment's formation in June of 1861 at the age of nineteen.  As the unit marched towards its destiny at Gettysburg, they were battle-hardened veterans.  They were one of the few units still in the Army of the Potomac in the summer of 1863 that had been at the Battle of First Bull Run.  They served on the Peninsula and at Second Manassas, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville.  Through all of these engagements the regiment was only a shadow of its original muster roll.  As the regiment came to Gettysburg they were now lead by the twenty-one year old Bailey and mustered 354 men and officers.

As part of Burling's Third Brigade, Second Division of the Third Army Corps, the unit was guaranteed action on July 2 by the decisions of their corps commander, Major General Daniel Sickles.  Burling's Brigade was initially deployed in support and through a myriad of moves ended up being completely dispersed until Colonel Burling himself literally had no brigade to command.

At 3 o'clock Colonel Burling ordered the 2nd New Hampshire to the support of Charles Graham's Brigade of Birney's Division at the Peach Orchard.  Unbeknownst to them, the men from the Granite State were now headed straight towards the center of a building storm.

I was at once ordered to support Battery G, First New York Artillery, and one section of a battery unknown, all light 12-pounders, brass. In this position my left rested upon the right of the Sixty-third Pennsylvania, my right covered by a wood house situated upon the Emmitsburg road, line forming a right angle with that road. Two hundred yards in my front the Third Maine was skirmishing with the enemy.

Foundation of the Wentz House with Peach Orchard in the background
Bailey says he double-quicked his men into the position above in the official report he submitted only three days after the battle.  Clearly something was under way.  The wood house he writes of is the Wentz House that stood on the east side of the Emmitsburg Road, just across from Joseph Sherfy's Peach Orchard.

He continues: At 4 o'clock, while experiencing a terrific fire of spherical case and canister from batteries in my front and on my right, 650 yards distant, I directed the rolls of my companies to be called, and found but 8 of the total number equipped absent. These had fallen out of the ranks from sunstroke and exhaustion while moving by double-quick to position.

At 4.30 p. m. the Third Maine was withdrawn from our front to our rear, and about this time a battery and a section of Rodman pieces were substituted for those we were supporting. These pieces were worked with great inefficiency, and at 5 o'clock it was observed that a brigade of the enemy was advancing on our right, in column of battalions massed, while two regiments were moving directly parallel with my front to the left, evidently with design to turn that flank.

The cannonade from Alexander's Batteries had begun spewing the introduction to Longstreet's assault on the Federal left.  Although times seem to be very contentious when it comes to the battle of Gettysburg, Bailey seems to be really accurate.  While in the bustle of movements, he may not have seen a lot of Hood's Division moving towards the Round Tops.  Clearly they must have heard the ruckus though.  As he says above, "it was observed that a brigade of the enemy was advancing on our right."  This would have been Barksdale's Brigade.  The two regiment's he speaks of, "parallel with my front to the left," would have been from Kershaw's South Carolina Brigade, already laying siege to the Stoney Hill area.  As the South Carolinians noticed the large gap between Stoney Hill and the Peach Orchard, the left side of the brigade turned towards the north.

The batteries posted along the Wheatfield/Millerstown Road opened up on the Confederates with canister charges and blew large destructive holes in their advancing ranks.  However destructive, the Palmetto Staters still came on.  Seeing an opportunity to quell the advance, Colonel Bailey made a quick and ambitious decision.  It was at this point that the action began to quickly build in intensity for the boys of the 2nd New Hampshire.

Area into which the 2nd New Hampshire charged from the Peach Orchard.
The Rose Farm is visible in the ravine which is to the south of Sherfy's
orchard, the point to where Kershaw's men retreated.

I reported these facts to Gen. Graham, and asked permission to charge, the enemy being close upon us--so near that the officer commanding the section of battery spiked his pieces, fearful that he should lose them. The general gave me directions to go forward, when I gave the order. My regiment started immediately, and advanced 150 yards at a run with a yell and such impetuosity as to cause the enemy to retire to a ravine 250 yards in our front, where they were covered from our fire, when I directed the fire of my battalion of the left oblique by the flank at about the same distance. My fire was so galling, assisted by that from the Third Maine, which had come up and taken part upon my left, as to cause them to break and seek shelter, when my attention was again called to my right, strengthened by the Sixty-third Pennsylvania forming at right angles with my front and parallel with the Emmitsburg road, upon which was advancing the brigade of the enemy, moving by battalion in mass, in line of battle. I immediately directed the fire of my battalion to the right oblique full upon it. Yet their line of fire, assisted by a terrible discharge of spherical case from their batteries, caused the Sixty-eighth Pennsylvania to retire, and at the same moment the Third Maine moved 200 yards to the rear, though in good order.

Even the best laid plans and intentions sometimes take offense to an evolving battlefield.  The sudden forward movement of the 2nd New Hampshire forced the 8th and 3rd South Carolina Battalion back towards the Rose Farm buildings   Although the charge was "impetuous" enough to put a damper on Kershaw's men for the time being, the new threat to the right changed the rules for Bailey and his men of granite.

View south over the Peach Orchard 
This young man was up to the challenge though.  Directing their blazing Sharps Rifles to the right oblique, Bailey turned the regiment's attention toward the salient and the top of the hill.  It was at this very moment that the crown of Sickles' Salient began to unravel.  Barksdale's Mississippians had made an impetuous advance of their own and it was more than Graham's Brigade could handle.

Just as Barksdale's men were nearing the west face of the Union salient, Wofford's Georgians stepped off the ridge to the west, only six hundred yards distance.  Things began to come apart quickly.  Taking fire from two sides and being pinched in what was essentially a giant bear trap, the men of Graham's Brigade fought with stiff resistance.  The fire power added by the 2nd New Hampshire was much need on this afternoon.

Unfortunately for the Federal troops around the Peach Orchard, their line was just too thin and covered too much ground.  On top of that they were taking fire from two directions.  One by one, the regiment's of Graham's Brigade were forced to relinquish their positions around the intersection of the Emmitsburg Road and the Wheatfield/Millerstown Road.  Barksdale's Mississippians were coming on full throttle and although they lost men at every step, they had the momentum.  Bailey and his men now seemed to be on an island all alone, the friendly forces that were just moments before fighting alongside were now melting farther away with each passing second.  Seeing Wofford making a beeline down the Wheatfield/Millerstown Road and already realizing the threat to their left from Confederates in the Stoney Hill area, there was nothing left for the Granite Staters to do but attempt a fighting withdrawal, an escape.

J.S. McNeily of Barksdale's 21st Mississippi remembered this.  All (Barksdale's men) met with stiff resistance.  But when the blue coats saw us swarming over the fences and across the Emmetsburg Road, without pausing, they began to 'back out.'  Though they fought back bravely, retiring slowly until the firing was at close quarters, when the retreat became a rout in which our men took heavy toll for the losses inflicted on them.   

Colonel Bailey picks up the story from his official report.  Finding myself thus unsupported, and the enemy steadily advancing, I ordered my regiment to fall back slowly, firing, which was fully executed. I moved to the rear 140 yards, and halted my line under the brow of the hill, halting also on the brow to give a volley to the enemy, then distant but 20 yards. The positions of the three regiments was that of echelon at about 20 paces, my regiment being the apex. The enemy continued advancing until they reached the brow of the hill, when their left swept toward the Sixty-third Pennsylvania in such overwhelming numbers as to cause it to give way; and fearing those regiments which had been observed marching toward my left might appear upon that flank, and knowing our efforts must prove futile against such fearful odds, I gave the order to retire, which was done quite rapidly, yet coolly, and without excitement as they went. I rejoined the brigade at about 6.30 p. m., fearfully diminished in numbers, yet firm and fearless still.

Rose House - Rally point for Kershaw's South Carolinians
Witnesses to the withdrawal of Birney's Division from the Peach Orchard are in some cases very different with regards to how the retreat was conducted.  We do know for sure that a number of regiments, including the 2nd New Hampshire, turned to fight numerous times, slowly giving ground step by step.  Colonel Calvin Augustus Craig of the 105th Pennsylvania in Graham's Brigade reported that his regiment reformed to fight between eight and ten times as they came off the field.

This can provide us with a few interesting inferences about the fighting that evening.  First off, as stated previously, the Army of the Potomac had their fighting blood up as they turned to face Lee on their own free soil at Gettysburg.  Although the troops of the Third Corps were in a bad position, they fought hard and victory would not come easily for the Army of Northern Virginia.  Secondly, if we look at some of the regiments fighting in the area of the Peach Orchard, casualties really do tell the story.  Many of the units that reported resistance fighting suffered the most casualties just as one would expect.  This is further evidence of the quality of the information we can pull out of the OR reports.  On top of that, we see the importance of the underlying variables within a battle, those of space and time.  As illustrated time and again at Gettysburg, because of the staunch resistance offered after the Confederate attack was under way, enough time was bought by the sacrifice of Union soldiers in the Peach Orchard to fill the newly created gaps on the Cemetery Ridge line.  Tactical space was sacrificed and purchased with manpower, all for the sake of time.  While Bailey and his men were holding out in the salient with other Third Corps troops, Federal troops were being rushed to other parts of the line.  The argument about ramifications in relation to cause and effect of command decisions is for a later date.

Lastly, whether one agrees or disagrees with the tactical decisions of the Third Corps commander on that day, one thing is certain.  McLaws' Division suffered enormous losses as it banged its head off the Peach Orchard salient.  Although they eventually crushed the position, it greatly sapped their manpower which caused the attack to fizzle out short of their true objective, Cemetery Ridge.  The other detrimental factor is the amount of time lost, again going back to the underlying variables within a battle.  Although Longstreet's attack did not get under way until about four o'clock in the afternoon (and later for McLaws' Division), the confederates burned time and resources in taking a position that really held no significant tactical or strategic value.

Peach Orchard from Stoney Hill
Regardless of the conclusions we might draw from the actions around the Peach Orchard, for Colonel Edward Bailey and the 2nd New Hampshire, their valiant defense came at a monumental cost.  The regiment came to the field with 354 officers and men.  Of that number they lost 22 men killed outright, 137 wounded (22 mortally) and 36 captured or missing.  Their total losses were 193 men, or fifty-five percent of their engaged force.  Bailey's skillful employment and tactical intelligence prevented the regimental losses from being even greater.  Much credit is due to his line officers and the men over whom he commanded.  Only a well disciplined bunch could have performed the maneuvers they did.  Their bravery and endeavor helped to keep Meade's Cemetery Ridge position intact, in concert with other actions, ultimately the reason for Union victory at Gettysburg.  

As for the survivors of the fight in Pennsylvania, the war was far from over.  For some of them, a date with the death reaper still awaited in the coming years.  Colonel Edward Bailey was one of those who never had that appointment although he was wounded twice more.  In fact he survived to remain in the regular army until 1893, when he was dismissed for "conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman."  While the full details remain unknown, he lived a very long life and was very active in veterans affairs, always respected.  He died in 1930 at the age of eighty-eight in his home at Bedford, New Hampshire.  His service for the Union cause during the Civil War was that of a formidable and brave officer, all at a very young age.  He and his men of granite fought a gallant fight on the afternoon of July 2, 1863 at the Peach Orchard, one of thousands of gallant fights on those fateful three day at Gettysburg.  Colonel Bailey himself may have said it best.

This battalion entered the fight with a firm determination to do or die, and the long list of fallen comrades, already submitted, will show how well it kept that resolution.

Where all did so well it would be invidious to make comparisons. Let it suffice to say that they did their part as becomes sons of the old Granite State. For our fallen braves, who have so gloriously perished fighting for their country, we drop a comrade's tear, while we extend our heartfelt sympathy to those dear ones far away who find the ties of kindred and friends thus rudely severed, and for those who must suffer untold agony and pain through long weeks of convalescence our earnest sympathy, yet leaving them to the watchful care of Him who will not prove unmindful of their necessities.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 
Col. Second New Hampshire Volunteers
Near Gettysburg, Pa., July 5, 1863

Sunset at the Peach Orchard

Busey, John W., and David G. Martin. Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg. Fourth. Hightstown, NJ: Longstreet House, 2005. 133, 153. Print.

Busey, John W. These Honored Dead, The Union Casualties at Gettysburg. 1st Ed. Baltimore, MD: Longstreet House, 1988. 89. Print.

Dodge , Russ. "Edward Lyon Bailey." (2003): n.pag. Find A Grave. Web. 7 Mar 2013. <>.

McNeily, J.S.. "Barksdale's Mississippi Brigade at Gettysburg, "Most Magnificent Charge of the War"." Trans. Array Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, Volume 14. Harvard UniversityThe Society, 1914. 237. Print.

Scott, Robert N.. "Series I Vol. 27. Part I Reports. Gettysburg." Trans. Array War of the Rebellion Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. The National Historical Society. Republication. Ann Arbor, MI: Historical Times Inc, 1985. 573-575. Print.

Smith, Karlton. "We Drop a Comrade's Tear." Gettysburg National Military Park. National Park Service, n.d. Web. 7 Mar 2013. <>.

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