The Maryland Campaign Begins
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| 50th PA on parade in Beaufort, SC early in the war |
After
suffering demoralizing defeats on the Peninsula and at Manassas for the second
time, Lincoln knew that General George B. McClellan (“Little Mac”) was the only
officer at his disposal who could boost morale and reorganize the Federal Army
in time for Lee's next move. McClellan
took over command of the Army of the Potomac on September 2nd, 1862 and as Lee
moved north into Maryland on the 4th, he was forced to pursue. The 50th PA marched north from their safety
in the Washington defenses along with the rest of the Army of the Potomac
carrying a renewed fighting spirit to meet Lee's Army and destroy it. The 50th was attached to Reno's IX Corps as a
part of Willcox's 1st Division, Christ's 1st Brigade. The command of the regiment fell to Major
Edward Overton Jr. since Colonel Christ was promoted to brigade command and
Lieutenant Colonel Brenholtz was still recovering from the wound he received at
Second Manassas.
On September
13th, while camping near Frederick, MD, members of 27th Indiana found a piece
of paper wrapped around three cigars that would completely turn the tide of the
campaign in favor of the Army of the Potomac.
This piece of paper was "Special Order 191" which was supposed
to be delivered to Confederate General Daniel H. Hill from Robert E. Lee on
September 9th. The soldiers who
discovered the orders quickly passed the document up the chain of command until
it reached General McClellan's headquarters.
Once McClellan realized what the document contained, he was sure he
could whip 'Bobby Lee' at his own game.
The orders contained Lee's entire plan to dispatch Jackson, McLaws and
Walker to capture the garrison at Harper's Ferry while the rest of his command
and Longstreet concentrated around Hagerstown, Maryland.
Along with
his forces at Harper's Ferry, Lee dispatched General Daniel H. Hill's Division
to protect the passes over South Mountain until his scattered army could
reunite near Sharpsburg. With all this
knowledge at hand thanks to the 'lost order', and after more delay, McClellan
finally made his move on the morning of September 14th, sending his army
towards the gaps on South Mountain.
Three major fights would ensue at Turner's, Fox's, and Crampton's Gaps.
The 50th PA
participated in the battle at Fox's Gap.
They were ordered to protect the left flank and held firm during a
counter-charge with a portion of Cox's Kanawha Division, suffering only two
casualties during the engagement. Their
actions in the gap were by all accounts trying and steadfast as they endured
Rebel artillery for a substantial period of time, all the while standing
firm. The 17th Michigan of their own
brigade suffered a great deal more in casualties as they led an assault along
the Old Sharpsburg Road, their very first taste of combat during the war. They
drove the Rebels down the mountainside, but at a great cost. Of their nearly 500 men that entered the
fight that day, they lost 27 killed and 114 wounded.
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| Reno Monument at South Mountain Battlefield |
Also during
the battle at Fox's Gap, the IX Corps' commander, General Jessie Reno, was
mortally wounded. As he was taken to the
rear a famous encounter took place between General Reno and one of his division
commander's General Samuel Sturgis, who was a good friend from before the
war. He remarked,"Hallo Sam, I'm
dead! Yes, yes, I'm dead! Good bye!" Shortly there after he passed away. He would later be replaced by Brigadier
General Jacob Cox and thus ended the first vicious fight of the Maryland
Campaign at Fox's Gap as a Federal victory.
On the 15th
of September the Confederates gave up their remaining positions on South
Mountain at Turner's Gap to concentrate in a defensive position around
Sharpsburg and await the hopefully timely arrival of General Jackson from Harper's
Ferry. After more unduly delay,
McClellan would finally move his men towards Sharpsburg as well, ever
apprehensive from exaggerations of being outnumbered and overpowered. The Army of the Potomac would camp within
spitting distance of the Army of Northern Virginia on the night of September
16th after some afternoon skirmishing west of the Antietam Creek that faded
with the sun.
General
Jackson, after capturing the garrison, had indeed arrived from Harper's Ferry
and reinforced the Confederate left flank.
Jackson left one division under General A.P. Hill at Harper's Ferry to
finish the job of processing prisoners and supplies, with orders to make haste
to Sharpsburg as soon as practicable.
That evening a steady rain began to fall and the men of both sides
passed a restless night filled with premonitions about what the morrow held in
store for them. Many of the veterans
surely held much anticipation for battle, as if a great storm were brewing.
The Bloodiest Day in American History
For the 50th
PA, September 17th, 1862 began wearily, with the regiment having been assigned
guard duty the previous evening. Very
early that morning after a soggy venture on the picket line, the men of the 50th
PA and the rest of the IX Corps awoke to the sounds of heavy musketry and
artillery to the northwest. Encamped
east of the Antietam Creek on the Rohrbach Farm, action would be slow to reach
these men. Burnside's troops, if in fact you can call them Burnside's, had a grand
view of the morning's battlefield.
“From our position we looked, as it
were, down between the opposing lines as if they had been the sides of a
street, and as the fire opened we saw wounded men carried to the rear and
stragglers making off. Our lines halted,
and we were tortured with anxiety as we speculated whether our men would charge
or retreat.”
- Major General Ambrose Burnside
With the
restructuring of the Army of the Potomac, McClellan made Burnside a Wing
Commander and he acted as such at the Battle of South Mountain, just three days
prior. With the impending battle and the
death of General Jessie Reno, Brigadier General Jacob Cox of the Kanawha
Division became commander of the IX Corps.
This left Burnside, to some degree, jobless because McClellan had
abandoned his previous notions of having wing commanders and never really
established what command Burnside was to possess. This created a very awkward kink in the
hierarchy of the IX Corps. Many historians have argued that this might have been
the reason for their problems on the battlefield that day. Burnside's respite towards McClellan would
rear its ugly head many times in the battle to come. Throughout the morning hours, the men of the
IX Corps kept their eyes on the devastation to the north as it slowly
progressed towards their positions, from The Cornfield, to Dunker Church, to
the Sunken Road.
When orders
did finally successfully arrive to Burnside from McClellan, the progress was
slower still. The first orders were
received around 7AM with McClellan ordering the IX Corps to “stand bye.” Finally at 10AM, Burnside was ordered to push
across the Lower Rohrbach Bridge and coordinate his attack in the general
direction of the Bridge Road that meandered its way into Sharpsburg, about a mile
to the northwest. It was also made very
clear to him that he was to carry the bridge at all costs. After some delay, Burnside and Cox finally
had a plan they thought worthy of taking the bridge. They would deploy General Isaac Rodman's 3rd
Division to the south, by which they would ford the Antietam at a location
previously selected by McClellan's engineers and then swing north. Meanwhile, the rest of the IX Corps would
push across the bridge in force, hoping to reunite with Rodman's Division on
the west bank of the creek and advance towards the town from there. Little did the commanders of the IX Corps
truly understand the difficulties to come in this endeavor.
General
Sturgis' Division was chosen to lead the assault across the bridge and the
geography around it proved to be a difficult obstacle to overcome. The eastern bank of the Antietam has a wide
flood plain that created a very large and open field of fire for anyone
defending an attempted crossing from the opposite bank. The western bank slopes steeply down into the
creek for nearly one hundred feet and was entirely wooded at the time of the
battle. For the Rebel defenders,
this steep and very defensible bluff
would prove to be an impregnable fortress.
Sturgis really had no idea how many Rebels held the opposite bank and
poor reconnaissance made Federal officers believe that they would receive
little resistance. In fact, with just
two Confederate regiments defending the bridge, a coordinated assault from an
entire division looks favorable numerically.
But there in lies the problem.
General
Robert E. Lee's right flank was the weakest part of his battle line being
forced to pull troops to aid his actions to the north. By the time the IX Corps assault began, Lee
had one division remaining there under General D.R. Jones from Longstreet's
Corps. The terrain on the west side of
the Antietam was Jones' only ally for the fight that was to come. Although greatly outnumbered, the mile or so
between the Antietam Creek and Sharpsburg was probably the best defensive
ground on the entire battlefield. That
being said, Jones had to place his brigades carefully. He placed Toombs' Georgia Brigade along the
west bank of the creek to thwart any attempted thrusts across the bridge. His orders clear, Toombs had the 2nd and 20th
GA regiments posted directly above the bridge and their combined 500 men were
to make life miserable for the Federals attempting to cross. The rest of Jones' Division was positioned on
the heights just outside of town with plenty of artillery support from the
vicinity of Cemetery Hill.
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| Burnside's (Lower Rohrbach) Bridge |
The first
attempt on the bridge was made by the 11th CT with promised support from
Crook's Kanawha Brigade that never came.
Rebel artillery had the bridge area in the cross-hairs and a few
batteries on the heights west of the Bridge Road wreaked havoc on the Federal
positions, all the while receiving counter battery fire from heavy Federal
batteries to the east. The 11th charged
up the Bridge Road subjecting themselves to a deadly fire of shell and musketry
that sliced through their ranks and left their Colonel Henry Kingsbury, the
brother-in-law of Confederate General D.R. Jones, mortally wounded. The regiment sacrificed 138 men in their
attempt on the bridge.
Division
commander, General Sam Sturgis, then ordered Brigadier General James Nagle to
advance his brigade in an effort to take the bridge. Nagle ordered the 48th PA and a few batteries
on the crest to provided covering fire for the rest of the brigade, as it would
then head north up the Lower Bridge Road in a very similar manner as the
previous attack. The rebels on the hill
held their fire until the boys from the 9th New Hampshire and 2nd Maryland came
into what must have seemed like a 'Valley of Death.' Casualties during the advance were
staggering and the attack stalled about seventy five yards from the
bridge. The two regiments lost a
combined 137 men in another failed assault.
Finally it
was the turn of Brigadier General Edward Ferrero's Brigade to make an attempt
on the bridge. He decided he would use
both the 51st NY and 51st PA to spearhead his assault, using the remaining
regiments for covering fire. This time
though, Ferrero would make his assault from the hill directly east of the
bridge, shortening the distance to the bridge and minimizing enfilading fire. As he called his men into line of battle, one
of the men from the 51st PA cried, "Will you give us our whiskey
back?", referring to a previous embargo placed on the regiment for bad
behavior. Ferrero replied, "If you
take that bridge you can have all the whiskey you want!" With that the 51st PA, 51st NY, and 35th MA
headed directly toward the bridge, down the slope and across the shortened
field of fire. Although the flanking
fire of the Georgians on the opposite hillside was narrowed, the brigade sustained
heavy casualties. This time though, the
attack slowly started to make its way across the bridge, inch by inch. The Rebels on the hillside realized that the
shear numbers in front of them would spell their demise and wisely began to
pull back. At this point, Ferrero's
Brigade began to pour over the span and Burnside finally had his bridge. The
51st PA also got its' whiskey back.
Meanwhile,
farther to the south, Isaac Rodman's division was having all kinds of trouble
finding the ford because of poor reconnaissance and faulty maps. When they did finally find the ford selected
by McClellan's engineers, it proved to be unsuitable for crossing since the
banks on both sides were simply too steep to quickly and efficiently cross the
creek with a whole division. This was
just one more blunder on a slate of blunders that would plague the IX Corps
assault on Lee's right, providing him more time to bring up reinforcements that
would change the course of the battle.
On top of
the delay, much of the fighting at the northern end of the battlefield had died
down by this time, allowing Lee to focus his attention to the south. This does not necessarily reflect a positive
circumstance though because he still had to keep his defensive lines intact to
the north in case of a renewed attack by McClellan. The problems for the Army of Northern
Virginia on September 17th had more to do with simply being outnumbered. McClellan played his cards to Lee's favor
though, by buying him time to mass his troops and by simply attacking without
any coordination.
After some
more difficulty, Rodman's staff was finally able to locate a suitable crossing
point a half mile farther downstream.
This location is known as Snavely's Ford and although it is only a mile
as the crow flies from the Lower Rohrbach Bridge, Rodman had to march his men
almost two miles to get to the crossing.
Both Harland and Fairchild's Brigades made their way across the ford
with little harassment, all the while being watched by men of the 50th GA, who
slowly retired to the west. For Rodman's
Division, their long day was just beginning as the attack that awaited them
would prove equally as trying.
The Grand Attack
Finally
across the Antietam Creek and after nearly three hours of lost time, Burnside
and Cox were ready to form their IX Corps for a push against the one
Confederate division defending the heights outside of Sharpsburg. Since Sturgis' Division was used in
assaulting the bridge, his men would act as a reserve for the general
advance. On the right of the attacking
line would be the division of Orlando B. Willcox with his brigades of Benjamin
Christ on the right and Thomas Welsh on the left. Rodman's Division would make up the left
flank of the advance with Fairchild's Brigade on the right and Harland's on the
left. Scammon's Kanawha Division would
act as a support for both Rodman and Willcox as they advanced. All said, the advancing Federal line would be
nearly a mile wide.
As the
Federals formed up in the low area adjacent to the Bridge Road, the
Confederates poured a galling fire into their ranks from the batteries posted
on the heights around town. Known to
many who fought there as “Artillery Hell,” this part of the Antietam
Battlefield provided plenty of fireworks from both sides in regards to
artillery.
As more men fell
victim to the rain of iron, the men of the IX Corps continued to form their
battle line and after a half hour, they were ready for the advance.
“Now a large force made its
appearance, marching to the front, having debouched from the woods on the banks
of the Antietam, which had partially concealed them. At the same time heavy
bodies were observed moving to attack our troops on the right, composed of
Drayton's and a portion of Kemper's brigades. I moved my command some distance
to the front in the standing corn (as many of my guns were short range), in
order that they could produce more effect, and opened fire.”
- Brigadier General R.B. Garnett
The
terrain that proved such an ally to D.R. Jones' Division was equally detrimental
to the Federal advance. A series of
steeply rolling hills, bisected by the Bridge Road caused serious delays in
portions of the advancing Federal line.
It might be likened to a wave, pushing and stalling in different
locations along its length as it progressed.
The Confederates were also thwarting Federal efforts by posting
skirmishers well in advance of their own line to snipe away at every step of
the attack, using terrain features to their advantage. One regiment, the 15th SC, greatly bolstered
its reputation on this day by putting up a deadly and defiant stand along the
center of the Federal line, harassing every movement.
Colonel
Benjamin Christ's Brigade, on the extreme right of the line, advanced under a
severe hail of artillery to the crest of the ridge above the Sherrick Farm, all
the while meeting resistance from the 56th VA of Garnett's Brigade. The 'Highlanders' of the 79th NY were out
front skirmishing followed by the main battle line comprised of the 28th MA,
50th PA and 17th MI.
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| Monument to the 50th PA at the crest of the hill north of the Sherrick Farm |
“Prostrated upon
the ground at the crest of the hill, we endured a severe fire from the enemy's
artillery.” - Adj. Lewis
Crater 50th PA
After reaching the crest, Christ realized
that Welsh's Brigade to the left was lagging behind, so he ordered a halt to
the advance until they could catch up.
Welsh's men were receiving the brunt of the 15th SC's stand and also
faced obstacles around the Otto Farm slowing their forward progress. After delivering a few well aimed volleys,
they resumed their advance, the 45th and 100th
PA driving the Rebels before them.
Finally reunited, both Christ and Welsh were ready to continue their
push towards Sharpsburg.
The
southern end of the line was having equal success, but at a great cost, losing
men with every step across the fields of the Otto Farm. Fairchild's Brigade pushed west towards the
men of Kemper and Drayton's Brigades, hiding behind a stone wall on the distant
hill. As the men of the 9th, 89th and
103rd NY crossed the ravine in their front, they received a deadly potion of
musketry and shell from the infantry and lone battery posted along the
wall. The 9th NY Zouaves suffered most
as they were mowed down with canister from the battery in their front.
Federal
batteries also played their part in the attack rushing across the bridge and
advancing as they were permitted by cover of the infantry assault. Once the advancing line had passed the Otto
Farm they unlimbered along the ridge that runs to the south of the farm house
with three batteries totaling eighteen guns.
Cook's battery also had two guns in the Otto Orchard belching towards
the Rebel positions.
Although
the Confederate Brigades on the outskirts of Sharpsburg were putting up a
stubborn resistance to the Federal onslaught, the tides were beginning to move
against them. Being outnumbered and in
the face of a Federal attack that was full of alacrity and persistence, some regiments began to falter. On the Confederate left, Garnett's artillery
support pulled out and his regiments began to fall back towards town. Christ's Brigade provided a healthy dose of
musketry and showed no signs of retiring.
Welsh's Brigade also continued along the Bridge Road towards town, driving
Walker's South Carolinians in their front.
Willcox's two brigades continued their push nearly to the streets of
Sharpsburg and it appeared that the 'final' victory was near.
“While
halting under cover from the enemy directly in front, he opened a battery on my
left which commanded my whole line from left to right, and for thirty minutes
we were under a most severe fire of round shot, shell, grape, and canister, and
suffered severely. It was impossible to move forward for the reason before
stated - no place in the neighborhood that afforded any cover - and the
alternative presented itself either to retire from a good and only position
from which to advance on the enemy in front, or to wait patiently until some
demonstration on the left would compel him to change the direction of his fire.
Again, I could not get under cover without retiring at least 250 yards, in full
view of the enemy, and if there would have been the least confusion the men
might have retreated in disorder, and exposed and largely increased the list of
casualties. I chose the former, and was gratified by having my expectations
realized. A demonstration on the left compelled
the enemy to change the direction of his fire, and my supports coming, we moved
to the front, where we engaged the enemy on his left, and in about one hour
succeeded in driving both his artillery and infantry from the position.” - Colonel Benjamin Christ (Commander 1st
Brigade, 50th PA)
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| Looking towards Cemetery Hill from near the left center of the IX Corps battle line. The 50th PA Monument is on the cleared hill in the left background. |
Kemper and Drayton's Brigades were among
the last to start moving backwards and in fact, at times it seemed as if
Fairchild's assault was stalling because of the large holes being torn out of
his lines, but they too continued moving towards town.
Just
when it seemed that all might be lost and Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was
in danger of being totally and completely swept away, a dust cloud arose to the
west. That dust cloud brought with it,
not only the salvation of Lee's army, but the continuation of a war that would
cost many thousands more in lives and shattered homes. After processing prisoners and finishing up
the details of the successful Confederate capture of the Federal garrison at
Harper's Ferry, General A.P. Hill had made good on his orders from Stonewall
Jackson to make all haste to Sharpsburg with his light division. He had force-marched his men seventeen miles
in seven hours to reach the battlefield just in time.
Hill's
two brigades under Branch and Gregg launched a counter-attack at the perfect
place as well, right into the left flank of Rodman's Division. Harland's Brigade received the brunt of the
attack and total chaos ensued. The 8th
CT was to the front of the brigade, closing in on Fairchild's left flank, which
left it floating alone until Harland realized what was happening. Vicious hand-to-hand combat broke out as
Branch's and Gregg's men sliced through the Federal ranks in a 40-acre
cornfield that aided in masking their charge.
Harland attempted to reorganize to meet the new threat, but for his
green men of the 16th CT and 4th RI, this was their first action and they
simply could not change fronts in time.
“Colonel
Beach rallied them and returned to the attack, but they were again driven back,
this time out of the corn-field, beyond the fence. Here they were again
rallied, but as it was impossible to see the enemy; and the men were under fire
for the first time, they could not be held.” - Colonel Harland
Because
of their inability to reform with some sort of organization, the men started to
fall back in the direction from which they initially advanced. During this sway from assault to retreat,
Harland's Brigade was shattered, losing nearly half his men. It was also around this time that General
Rodman was mortally wounded while directing his men to face the new
threat. He was one more shining star
lost to the Federal Army in another failed attack full of lost opportunities.
Hill's
Division began rolling up the Federal line like a carpet and the men of
Willcox's Division could see what was coming.
They quickly started to withdrawal back across the Sherrick and Otto
Farms towards the Antietam Creek. In the
fields along the entire route of their retreat lay the men that fell from their
ranks during their trying and nearly successful attempt to turn Lee's right
flank.
As
Branch's Brigade had Fairchild's men reeling back across the fields of the Otto
Farm, General Hill was conferring with both Generals Branch and Gregg. To these three great warriors the field must
have looked something like a perfect storm.
Those waves of gray, led by their national standards, were the last
thing Brigadier General Lawrence Branch would ever see. He was hit in the head and instantly killed,
the sixth and last general to fall on that bloody day.
The
Federal line fell back to the west bank of Antietam Creek and formed a kind of
bridgehead around what would soon become known as Burnside's Bridge. Indeed it warranted a renaming as the IX
Corps lost nearly 3,000 men in their assault, while the Confederate forces lost
somewhere around 1,200. The men of the
IX Corps prepared themselves for another assault that would never come, thanks
to their always inching leader in General George McClellan. The Confederates pursued only as far as the
fields south of the Otto Farm before reforming their own line on the outskirts
of town. The implications of the repulse
of the IX Corps on this part of the field were a sort of salvation for General
Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia.
Indeed Lee must have had no qualms with McClellan biding his time. They put out skirmishers, but were satisfied
with keeping their distance until they could retire back across the
Potomac. Lee had been granted another
grand opportunity to continue the hostilities of war and in some ways, the
Maryland Campaign might be considered the rebirth of the Army of Northern
Virginia.
The Aftermath
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| Antietam National Cemetery on the 150th Anniversary of the battle |
For both
armies Antietam would represent a victory of some significance. Whether it was a matter of justification for
the vast amounts of human carnage, or simply military strategy, Antietam
changed the face of the American Civil War.
Lee surely
held concerns about McClellan's intentions on the days that followed September
17th, but he must have also been hopeful and maybe even confident that the
Commander of the Army of the Potomac would not change his tactics based fully
on his own prudence. On the 18th,
McClellan kept his army sitting and Lee quickly and efficiently ordered his
Army of Northern Virginia back across the Potomac River at Boteler's Ford. While the Federals were burying the dead,
McClellan was letting Lee slip away once more to continue a war full of ghastly
suffering for both sides. Some might
argue that the Maryland Campaign was the Union Army's greatest chance to end
the war early. In considering all the
botched plans and execution by McClellan at Antietam, the outcome is surely
tied to his apprehensions. Even after making
early mistakes, he was time and again presented with opportunities to be the
“Great Napoleon” that he perceived himself to be, and he failed by a wide
margin. Having nearly double the
strength of the Army of Northern Virginia, McClellan left a substantial reserve
force sitting in the rear on September 17th that would have been the
difference. Most of the Federal V and VI
Corps awaited an opportunity to get into the fight that day that would never
come.
The Army of
Northern Virginia had certainly proved that it could hold its own in enemy
territory. Although the overall campaign
may be painted as a failed invasion, Lee was able to split his army as he would
do many times later in the war. He gave the perception of a larger force in
such instances like the capture of Harper's Ferry, or the delaying action at
South Mountain by General D.H. Hill. The
Gray Fox had totally outdone the Army of the Potomac. With his military genius and an army full of
spirit, he had tested the waters for what lay ahead. Eight months later, Lee would again be
heading north into the heart of 'Yankee Country' and end up fighting at
Gettysburg.
Of course
McClellan proclaimed to Washington that a great victory was won at a great
cost. The folks in Washington, including
Lincoln himself, would eventually catch up to the transparency of McClellan's
arrogance and on November 5th, removed him from command. Before this though, Lincoln went to the
battlefield for a surprise visit on the first day of October, to see for
himself the devastation of war. He
visited with McClellan, Burnside and others who could fill in the details,
providing him a more vivid sense of the events that took place there. Lincoln probably also intended to get his
general moving again on Lee's army. What
was said between both he and McClellan will never be known since there are no
recorded details or witnesses to the sessions, but “Little Mac” was definitely
right about one thing, that being the great cost.
Antietam, to
this day and probably forever, will stand as the single bloodiest day in
American history. Over 22,000 men fell
in the fields around Sharpsburg on September 17th, 1862. Some regiments would never recover the fighting
capabilities they lost that day. The
leadership lost in the ranks was also devastating and something that would
haunt both armies in the battles to come.
Most of the men fighting that day would remember Antietam as the most
horrific experience of their lives, but they were also thankful for the
opportunity to carry on since many of their friends would remain in the fields
around Sharpsburg forever.
The war
would go on for another two and a half years and there was still much loss and
devastation to come, but no battle on a single day would come close to the
losses suffered at Antietam. For its
part in the IX Corps advance on Lee's right, the 50th PA suffered
substantially. Their casualties were 8
killed, 46 wounded and 3 missing, for a total of 57 men. Colonel Christ and Major Overton both
suffered wounds during the battle and Captain James Ingham of Company K was
killed. Their brigade had lost a total of 406 men in the Maryland
Campaign.
"On the 17th Edward Harner get
killed by a canon ball & a bullet went in my cap and cut the skin a little
on my head & one ball hid my Rifel O god the dead and wounded lays by
hunderds &1000s on the next day ...O that the almighty god in heaven would
make a ant of this war...The line of battle was twist as broud that our valy at
home ...You might think how I did feel when I saw so many boys fall out our
Regt. All I have to say take good care
of our children. O my dear children what you do dont curse nor sware so if I
cant see yous any more in this wourld so that we can meat in heaven were no war
and no fighting can be no more." - Sgt. Samuel Schwalm Co. A
50th PA
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| Colonel Benjamin Christ forever stands atop the 50th PA Monument gazing towards Cemetery Hill |
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